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Private Long-Term Care Insurance and the Asset
Protection Motive
Jennifer M. Mellor, PhD1
Policies focusing on increasing private insurance
coverage generally raise the question of which factors influence the decision to purchase this insurance
(see Appendix, Note 1). In the case of public–private
partnerships for long-term care the question is, more
specifically, what role does asset protection play in
the purchase of insurance? While a motive such as
asset protection is difficult to measure, it can be observed in part by quantifying the relationship between actual assets and insurance ownership. This
study examined the role of assets in the decision to
purchase insurance for long-term care using data
from the study of Asset and Health Dynamics Among
the Oldest Old (AHEAD; Myers, 1997). (See Myers
1997 for a description of the survey and initial research findings). The next section details the importance of examining the role of assets from a policy
perspective. In addition, the quantitative evidence
reported in previous literature regarding the role of
assets is reviewed. Existing studies have produced
mixed results, most suggesting that assets matter but
showing that the size and direction of the effect varies. An important issue regarding the role of assets—
whether the effect of assets differs for those with high
wealth as compared to low wealth—has not been explored adequately.
A methodology to control for this important type
of variation was employed in this analysis. The results lead to quite different conclusions than reported
elsewhere regarding the role of assets in the purchase
of long-term care insurance. That is, assets matter
most for those in the lowest fourth of the asset distribution and least for those in the upper fourth of distribution. Finally, this research examined whether the
role of assets is linked to asset protection for heirs, by
examining how long-term care insurance ownership
is related to expectations about financial transfers to
family members. The analysis reported here does not
support the view that long-term care insurance purchase is motivated by a desire to protect assets for
heirs.

This research examined the role of assets in the decision to
purchase insurance for long-term care using survey data from
the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) study. Previous research suggests that assets matter,
but the size and direction of the effect varies. An important issue regarding the role of assets has not been explored adequately—whether the effect of assets differs between less
wealthy and very wealthy individuals. A methodology to control for this type of variation is employed in this analysis. Results suggest that increases in assets have the greatest
influence on the probability that less wealthy individuals own
long-term care insurance, and have a negligible impact on the
wealthy. This has important implications for policies designed
to increase long-term care insurance ownership.

Key Words: Nursing home care, Public–private partnerships

The combined cost of nursing home care and
home health care in the United States was more than
$117 billion in 1998. Out-of-pocket expenses by individuals accounted for about one third of this figure,
government expenditures contributed about 59%
and third-party payments by private insurance covered just 7% (Health Care Financing Administration,
2000). The small contribution from private insurance
is not unexpected, as only 4% to 5% of elderly people are thought to have insurance policies that cover
long-term care (Cohen, Kumar, McGuire, & Wallack,
1992; Wiener, Illston, & Hanley, 1994). Current policies aimed at reducing the public portion of longterm care costs focus on expanding private insurance. For example, four U.S. states—California, Connecticut, Indiana, New York—are experimenting
with a program that allows individuals who buy a
given amount of private insurance coverage to protect their assets even if their long-term care costs exceed what is covered by the insurance. Called “public–private partnerships” for long-term care, these
plans are designed to encourage individuals to buy a
moderate amount of private coverage by providing a
form of guaranteed asset protection.

Background
The author thanks the National Institute on Aging for research support
(Grant R03-AG16868) and is grateful to three anonymous referees for
helpful comments.
1
Address correspondence to Jennifer M. Mellor, Assistant Professor of
Economics, The College of William and Mary, P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795. E-mail: jmmell@wm.edu

Several policy initiatives are aimed at increasing
private insurance coverage for long-term care. Recent changes in federal tax laws allow individuals to
deduct part of the cost of long-term care insurance
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premiums on income tax returns. At the state level,
four states have implemented “public–private partnerships” for long-term care that encourage individuals to purchase partial private insurance coverage for
long-term care. If private coverage fails to provide for
all of their long-term care needs, these individuals
can become eligible for Medicaid coverage of longterm care without having to spend down their assets
(not including their home) to the typical eligibility
threshold of $2,000. For example, an individual with
private insurance coverage for $50,000 in long-term
care costs can retain $50,000 of his or her assets and
become eligible for Medicaid when the private insurance coverage runs out. This is referred to as a “dollar-for-dollar” plan, where every dollar of private insurance coverage protects one dollar of assets. Three
states (Connecticut, Indiana, and California) have implemented dollar-for-dollar partnerships; a fourth
state, New York, has implemented a partnership program that offers protection of all assets with the purchase of limited private insurance coverage.
Various criticisms have been directed toward the
public–private partnerships since their inception and
implementation in the 1990s. Some dispute the costeffectiveness of the partnerships and believe that
these programs may in fact raise the overall amount
of long-term care spending by Medicaid. Another
concern is that the public will not be interested in
participating in this type of program, owing to fears
of reduced access and lower quality of care, and the
possible “welfare stigma” associated with Medicaid.
Additional criticisms of the public–private partnership programs concern the relevance of asset protection in purchasing long-term care insurance. Wiener
and Hanley (1992) argue that asset protection is a relatively unimportant reason for buying long-term care
insurance, and that increased asset protection opportunities will not induce a large number of individuals
to purchase new policies. They cite evidence from a
survey of long-term care insurance policyholders
suggesting that only 14% of the sample respondents
listed protection of assets as the “most important”
reason for buying insurance. Wiener and Hanley also
question the use of Medicaid to protect the assets of
middle and upper income elderly people. Finally,
Wiener and colleagues (1994) write that “back-end
coverage provides asset protection for heirs—arguably a less appropriate role for government” (p.144;
see Note 2).

estimate the effect of assets, controlling for other individual characteristics such as income, age, and
health status. This research expands upon these types
of studies by examining whether the effect of assets
differs among individuals with different levels of
wealth. As stated in the background section, there is
some concern about whether partnership programs
use Medicaid to protect the assets of the middle and
upper classes. To explore this concern, it is necessary
to determine how the effect of assets in the decision
to purchase insurance varies across different asset
groups. For example, among individuals with very
low levels of assets (who thus have little to protect
from Medicaid), assets may have less of an influence
on long-term care insurance decisions. Those with
assets over a certain minimum amount may have the
greatest incentive to protect assets from the spenddown process associated with qualifying for Medicaid. And, among very wealthy individuals, assets
may have a small effect on insurance purchase.
Those with the most wealth may elect to self-insure—
that is, to use their savings to finance long-term care
needs and forego the purchase of insurance policies.
These potential nonlinearities in the asset–insurance
relationship can suggest whether asset protection
plays more or less of a role for the wealthy, compared to the poor. The results reported here can thus
shed light on whether policy makers need to be concerned about using liberalized Medicaid eligibility
(via the partnerships) to protect the assets of wealthy
elders.

Previous Research
To date, only a few quantitative studies have examined the role of assets in long-term care insurance
ownership. Sloan and Norton (1997) used the
AHEAD study and the Health and Retirement Survey
to examine many factors linked to ownership of longterm care insurance, such as adverse selection, bequests, and crowding out by the Medicaid program,
in addition to income and assets. Their results suggest
that the level of nonhousing assets has a significant
positive effect on the probability of having long-term
care insurance. However, the size of the effect was
small: A $10,000 increase in assets led to a 1% increase in the probability of having insurance, from
2.20% to 2.22%. Sloan and Norton also examined
assets in the form of housing and found them to have
no effect on long-term care insurance coverage. This
finding may be explained by the fact that Medicaid
eligibility is determined by the level of assets excluding the value of the individual’s home. As a result,
housing wealth is protected from the spend-down
process.
If the relationship between assets and insurance
purchase is nonlinear, then the linear specification
used by Sloan and Norton may to some degree understate the true effect of assets in the decision to purchase insurance. Two other quantitative research
studies attempt to control for nonlinearities in the relationship between assets and long-term care insur-

Research Question
Evidence that only 14% of purchasers report asset
protection as the primary reason for buying long-term
care insurance is not enough to support the conclusion that assets are an unimportant factor. This statistic does not reflect the relative contribution of other
factors in the purchase of long-term care insurance,
nor does it take into account the factors that lead an
individual to choose not to purchase the insurance.
For this reason, several studies have used multivariate models of long-term care insurance purchase to
Vol. 40, No. 5, 2000
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ance ownership, but with opposite results. These
studies are described below.
Kumar, Cohen, Bishop, and Wallack (1995) used
data obtained from several insurance companies on
individuals who owned long-term care insurance
policies and individuals who declined to purchase
such policies when approached by insurance agents.
A logistic regression of the purchase decision was
performed, controlling for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, attitudes, and Medicaid
characteristics. Assets were measured with categorical dummy variables, which allowed for variation in
the magnitude of asset effects. Relative to the omitted
category of assets over $100,000, several categorical
dummies had significant and positive effects: assets
under $20,000, assets between $30,000 and $50,000,
and assets ranging from $75,000 to $100,000. These
results support the conclusion that those with assets
under $100,001 are more likely to purchase insurance relative to those with higher levels of assets.
Unfortunately, these results may not be generalizable
to the population as a whole because those approached by insurance agents are a nonrandom sample of the population. Individuals approached by
agents are more likely to have higher incomes and to
be in better health than most elderly individuals.
In McCall, Mangle, Bauer, and Knickman (1998),
data for a random sample of partnership program
participants (merged with nonparticipants) were used
to examine the factors associated with the purchase
of long-term care insurance through the partnerships.
The authors controlled for a variety of respondent
characteristics in a logistic regression of insurance
purchase. Assets levels were measured by three
categorical dummy variables ($100,001–$200,000,
$200,001–$400,000, and over $400,000) compared
to the omitted category of assets less than $100,000.
Odds ratios for the asset dummy variables were statistically significant and suggest that having assets
greater than $100,000 increases the odds of purchasing insurance. The largest effect was for assets between $200,000 and $400,000. At the highest asset
levels (over $400,000), the effect of assets remains
positive but is smaller in size than the effect of having
assets between $100,001 and $200,000. Together
with results regarding the effect of income on longterm care insurance ownership, the authors interpret
this finding as evidence “that the Partnership is having its desired effect of attracting middle-income and
asset consumers” (McCall et al., 1998, p.200). These
results are in contrast to Kumar and colleagues’ findings, but the study has some significant differences in
the sampling. The full sample included an oversample of purchasers, who made up as much as 58% of
all observations. In addition, 38% of the observations
in the McCall and colleagues’ sample have missing
data for assets (see Note 3).
In summary, previous research on the relationship
between assets and long-term care insurance produces mixed results. Evidence from Sloan and
Norton (1997) shows that assets have a small positive
effect on the likelihood of having long-term care in-

surance. Other research that addresses the nonlinearity in the asset and insurance relationship produces
contrasting results. In one case, assets less than the
omitted category of $100,000 are significant and
positive; in another case, assets greater than the omitted category of $100,000 are significant and positive.
This difference may be driven by the use of different
samples, but in both cases the samples used are nonrandom.

Methods
This research adds to the existing literature on the
effect of assets in the decision to purchase long-term
care insurance by using several methods to address
the nonlinearity in this relationship. The data that are
used in this study are similar to those used by Sloan
and Norton (1997); the methods of estimation differ
from their linear specification, and from other studies
that rely solely on categorical dummies for asset levels. The primary method of analysis in this research is
the estimation of a probit model of long-term care insurance where a spline function is used in the estimation of asset effects. The spline function allows for the
estimation of asset affects at varying ranges, and is
equivalent to estimating the model in several subsamples based on asset levels, and then using restrictions to “tie” the coefficients at the “knots” (breakpoints or cutoffs in assets) in the sample (see Note 4).
The knots can be chosen at various levels; some studies suggest breaking the sample into groups of equal
numbers of observations or groups of equal ranges in
the explanatory variable. In this case, the knots are
first set at the quartiles in the asset distribution for the
sample; several other options are also reported.
Data from Wave 1 of the AHEAD study (Public Release Version 2.10) are used in the analysis. AHEAD
is a nationally representative longitudinal study of
persons age 70 and older (in 1993) and their spouses.
The survey contains a wide variety of information on
health conditions, insurance coverage, family composition, and financial resources for 8,222 individuals in 6,047 households. Variable definitions and
means are reported in Table 1 for a sample of 8,121
respondents from the AHEAD survey with nonmissing data. All respondents in the AHEAD survey were
asked whether or not they owned an insurance policy for long-term care. Of those who answered this
question, 2.3% reported that they had a long-term
care insurance policy (see Note 5). Nonhousing assets are defined as the sum of financial assets less
debt (see Note 6). The mean of nonhousing assets in
the sample is $114,855 and is much higher among
the insured than the uninsured, as data in columns 2
and 3 suggest. Those with insurance have nonhousing assets at twice the level of those without insurance.
In addition to age and nonhousing assets, covariates included in the probit model are education,
race, marital status, health status, income, housing
equity, and dummies for urban residence and region
of residence. Education is measured in years and has
598
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Means
Variable Name
LTC policy
Age
Education
Non-White
Married
Female
Number of children
Poor health
Any ADLs
Any IADLs
MSA
Income
Assets
Housing equity
Sample size

Definition

Full Sample

Equal to 1 if individual reports having a
long-term care insurance policy
Age, in years
Years of education of individual
Equal to 1 if individual reported race
as other than White
Equal to 1 if individual is married
Equal to 1 if the respondent is a woman
Number of respondent’s children
Equal to 1 if individual reports that health status is poor
Equal to 1 if respondent reports difficulty
in any activity of daily living
Equal to 1 if respondent reports difficulty
in any instrumental activity of daily living
Equal to 1 if the respondent resides in a
(metropolitan statistical) area
Household income from all sources
Assets (not including value of housing equity)
The value of the respondent’s home less mortgage debt

a mean of 10.8. Race is measured with an indicator
variable, non-White; about 15% of respondents are
non-White. More than half of the individuals in the
sample are married, and 63% are women. Health status is measured by an indicator variable equal to one
if the respondent’s self-reported health status is listed
as poor on a scale ranging from poor to excellent.
Additional measures of health status include whether
the respondent reported difficulties in any of six
ADLs (activities of daily living) or five IADLs (instrumental activities of daily living). Poor health status
was reported by 12.9% of all respondents, and 29%
and 30% of respondents reported difficulties with at
least one ADL and IADL, respectively. Average
household income in the sample was $24,605. For a
discussion of the expected relationships between
these covariates and long-term care insurance, see
Mellor (2000).

1
75.09
12.90

Uninsured

0
76.56
10.74

0.151
0.547
0.632
2.77
0.129

0.060
0.639
0.612
2.61
0.033

0.153
0.545
0.633
2.77
0.132

0.290

0.175

0.293

0.297

0.202

0.299

0.756
$24,605
$114,855
$70,022
8,021

0.754
$36,199
$269,339
$104,071
183

0.756
$25,358
$111,249
$69,227
7,838

linear and squared values for assets are included to
account for nonlinearities in the relationship between
assets and insurance. The marginal effect for assets
doubles in size, and the squared term has a negative
coefficient. This suggests that although assets increase
the probability of having long-term care insurance, the
effect decreases as assets increase (see Note 8).
The third column reports results from a probit
model where assets are measured with three categorical dummy variables. Instead of the typical definition and interpretation of each dummy relative to one
omitted category of assets, these dummies are formulated to reveal differences in the effect of assets relative to the previous asset category. Here, the categories are defined as quartiles in the asset distribution.
The first variable is equal to one if assets exceed the
first quartile in the distribution; the second is equal to
one if assets exceed the second quartile; the third
equals one if assets exceed the third quartile (see
Note 9). For example, a person with assets at the 70th
percentile in the distribution will have a value of 1
for the first two dummies, and a 0 for the third. A respondent with assets at the 90th percentile will have
a value of 1 for all three dummies. The results from
this specification also reveal a nonlinear relationship
between assets and insurance. The effect of having
assets in successive quartiles has a positive effect on
insurance, but the marginal impact becomes very
small and is statistically insignificant at higher levels
of assets.
The fourth column of Table 2 reports results from
the preferred specification of a probit model with a
spline function in assets, where the knots of the
spline are based on the quartiles. This specification
again suggests that the marginal effect of assets becomes smaller at higher ranges in the asset distribution. For example, a $10,000 increase in assets leads

Results
In Table 2, results from probit models of the probability of owning a long-term care insurance policy
are reported. Marginal effects and t statistics are reported; standard errors of all estimates are adjusted
for the use of multiple observations per household
(see Note 7). For simplicity, the term “assets” will be
used to reference nonhousing assets, and “housing
equity” will be used to refer to the net value of the
home. The first column of Table 2 reports the results
using a linear specification in assets similar to Sloan
and Norton’s (1997) study. The estimated effect of a
$10,000 increase in assets on the probability of having a long-term care insurance policy is an increase
of 0.0001 percentage points over the baseline probability of 0.0230. This is a small 0.43% increase
[(0.00001 ⫻ 10)/0.023]. In the second column, both
Vol. 40, No. 5, 2000

0.023
76.52
10.79

Insured
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Table 2. Effect of Assets on Ownership of Long-Term Care Policy
Explanatory Variable
Assets (in 000s)

(1)

(2)

0.00001**
(2.69)

Assets squared

(3)

0.00002*
(2.15)
⫺1.91e-9
(1.17)

Assets greater than $3,000

0.011**
(2.54)
0.007⫹
(1.90)
0.003
(1.04)

Assets greater than $25,000
Assets greater than $105,000
Spline effects:
1st quartile: assets ⬍ $3,000
2nd quartile: $3000 ⱕ assets ⬍ $25,000
3rd quartile: $25,000 ⱕ assets ⬍ $105,000
4th quartile: assets ⱖ $105,000
Housing equity (in 000s)
Housing equity squared
Household income (in 000s)
Household income squared
Age
Age squared
Education
Non-White
Married
Female
Number of children
Poor health
Help with any activity of daily living
Help with any instrumental activity of daily living
Metropolitan statistical area
Southern U.S. state
Central U.S. state
Western U.S. state

(4)

2.39e-07
(1.31)
⫺1.97e-13
(1.24)
0.0004**
(3.29)
⫺0.000003*
(2.33)
0.007*
(2.30)
⫺0.00005*
(2.40)
0.002**
(3.75)
⫺0.005
(1.03)
⫺0.001
(0.40)
0.001
(0.57)
⫺0.0005
(0.82)
⫺0.010*
(2.23)
⫺0.003
(0.83)
0.002
(0.56)
⫺0.003
(0.92)
0.017**
(3.13)
0.024**
(3.81)
0.027**
(3.74)

1.93e-07
(0.99)
⫺1.60e-13
(0.93)
0.0004**
(2.90)
⫺0.000002*
(2.16)
0.007*
(2.30)
⫺0.00005*
(2.39)
0.002**
(3.64)
⫺0.004
(0.96)
⫺0.001
(0.46)
0.001
(0.57)
⫺0.0005
(0.76)
⫺0.010*
(2.20)
⫺0.003
(0.82)
0.002
(0.56)
⫺0.003
(0.84)
0.016**
(3.10)
0.024**
(3.78)
0.027**
(3.72)

1.05e-07
(0.62)
⫺8.13e-14
(0.63)
0.0003*
(2.53)
⫺0.000002⫹
(1.88)
0.007*
(2.39)
⫺0.00005*
(2.48)
0.001**
(2.83)
⫺0.001
(0.21)
⫺0.003
(1.11)
0.002
(0.87)
⫺0.0003
(0.53)
⫺0.008⫹
(1.94)
⫺0.002
(0.57)
0.002
(0.82)
⫺0.002
(0.74)
0.015**
(3.06)
0.020**
(3.52)
0.023**
(3.51)

0.006**
(2.58)
⫺0.00004
(0.19)
0.0001*
(2.05)
0.000004
(1.53)
8.85e-08
(0.60)
⫺8.28e-14
(0.74)
0.0003*
(2.50)
⫺0.000002⫹
(1.94)
0.006*
(2.34)
⫺0.00004*
(2.43)
0.001**
(2.76)
⫺0.0003
(0.07)
⫺0.002
(1.10)
0.001
(0.86)
⫺0.0003
(0.55)
⫺0.007⫹
(1.90)
⫺0.002
(0.63)
0.002
(0.81)
⫺0.002
(0.71)
0.012**
(2.94)
0.017**
(3.48)
0.020**
(3.51)

Notes: Marginal effects from probit models are calculated as  (x␤) ␤ where x is a vector of mean values for all explanatory variables.
Marginal effects for binary variables are calculated as the discrete change as the dummy goes from 0 to 1. The reported t statistics (in parentheses) are for the hypothesis test of the underlying coefficient being equal to zero. The sample contains 8,021 observations. The mean
of the dependent variable is 0.023.
⫹
p ⬍ .10; *p ⬍ .05; **p ⬍ .01.

to a 0.06 percentage point increase in the likelihood
of having long-term care insurance for individuals at
the bottom fourth of the asset distribution, but only a
0.000004 percentage point increase for individuals
in the top fourth of the distribution. The difference

suggests that the same absolute increase in assets has
a smaller effect for the wealthy than the poor, but this
may be expected because (in relative terms) the effect
of an extra $10,000 is much smaller for those with
the most assets. (A likelihood ratio test of the linear
600
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model versus the spline model rejects the linear
model in favor of the spline model.) To compare the
size of relative increases in assets, Table 3 reports
simulated effects of a 10% increase in assets (from
the mean in each quartile) on the percentage increase in the probability of having long-term care insurance.
The first three columns of Table 3 report (1) the
marginal effect from the probit model with a spline in
assets, (2) the mean level of assets, (3) the mean probability of owning long-term care insurance, in each
quartile. The fourth column calculates the effect of a
10% increase in assets in each range; the fifth column expresses that effect in terms of percentage increases in the probability of having long-term care insurance. As reported here, the same 10% increase in
assets has the largest effect for those in the bottom
fourth of the distribution where the probability of
having long-term care insurance increases by 10%.
At the next quartile, the effect of assets is insignificant, and small. In the third quartile (assets ranging from
$25,000 to $105,000), the effect of a 10% increase in
assets is a 2.1% increase in the probability of long-term
care insurance. Among those in the top fourth of
the distribution, the effect is again small—0.4%—and
based on a statistically insignificant coefficient.
To test the sensitivity of these results to the chosen
knots in the spline function, Table 3 also reports results from two additional specifications. In Model 2,

the knots are chosen at the 50th and 90th percentiles
(see Note 10). Because only six individuals in the
bottom 4th of the asset distribution had long-term
care insurance, this specification combines the bottom two fourths of the distribution. The use of a knot
at the 90th percentile tests the effect of assets among
the top 10% of the asset distribution. A similar pattern appears in these results: For those in the bottom
half of the distribution, assets have the strongest effect, and for those at the very top of the distribution,
assets have the smallest effect. In Model 3, the observations are divided into three groups based on the
33rd and 66th percentiles of assets. Here, the effect
of a 10% increase in assets on the probability of having insurance is 1.4% for the bottom third and somewhat higher at 1.8% for the middle third. Again, the
effect is smallest (0.5%) for the highest asset range.
To test the magnitude of these asset effects relative
to other factors influencing long-term care insurance
ownership, the effects of 10% increases in household
income and education were calculated from the marginal effects reported in Table 2, using changes from
mean values of income and education. The effect of
a 10% increase in income ranges from a 3% to 4.3%
increase in the probability of having insurance; the
effect of a 10% increase in education ranges from
4.7% to 9.4%. The effects of a 10% increase in assets,
while large in some ranges, are generally smaller
than the effects of income and education.

Table 3. Assets Effects on LTC Insurance Ownership Tests of Robustness to Thresholds

Assets, by Range
(in 000s of $s)
Model 1
1st–24th percentile
(n ⫽ 1999)
25th–49th percentile
(n ⫽ 1974)
50th–74th percentile
(n ⫽ 2029)
75th–100th percentile
(n ⫽ 2019)
Model 2
1st–49th percentile
(n ⫽ 3973)
50th–89th percentile
(n ⫽ 3245)
90th–100th percentile
(n ⫽ 803)
Model 3
1st–32nd percentile
(n ⫽ 2624)
33th–65th percentile
(n ⫽ 2669)
66th–100th percentile
(n ⫽ 2728)

Marginal
Effect
(1)

0.006**
(2.58)
⫺0.00004
(0.19)
0.0001*
(2.05)
0.000004
(1.53)
0.0005**
(2.77)
0.00002
(1.63)
0.000004
(1.22)
0.002*
(2.33)
0.0001*
(2.07)
0.000005⫹
(1.82)

Mean of
Assets in Range
(in 000s of $s)
(2)

Mean Probability
of LTC Insurance
(3)

Effect of a 10%
Increase in Assets
From Mean…
(Col 1) ⫻
(10% ⫻ Col 2)
(4)

⫺0.575

0.003

0.0003

11.236

0.014

⫺0.00004

0.3%

56.883

0.028

0.0006

2.1%

388.712

0.046

0.0002

0.4%

5.293

0.008

0.0003

3.8%

102.576

0.033

0.0002

0.6%

706.558

0.052

0.0003

0.6%

.667

0.007

0.0001

1.4%

28.204

0.017

0.0003

1.8%

309.468

0.044

0.0002

0.5%

…Expressed as a
Percentage Increase in
Probability of LTC Insurance
(Col. 4/Col. 3) ⫻ 100
(5)

10%

Notes: All models include the following explanatory variables: income, income squared, age, age squared, housing equity, housing
equity squared, education, female, married, number of children, non-White, poor health, and whether the respondent has difficulty with
any activity of daily living (ADL) or instrumental ADL, and dummies for residence in a metropolitan statistical area and by region.
⫹
p ⬍ .10; *p ⬍ .05; **p ⬍ .01.
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fect of assets for those with heirs in the form of children or a spouse and those without.
Finally, an asset protection motive for purchasing
long-term care insurance may be apparent through
the relationship between long-term care insurance
ownership and the respondents’ expectations about
events such as leaving an inheritance or lending financial support to a relative. Table 4 shows the effects of four variables reflecting expectations about:
(1) providing financial help to family members; (2)
leaving an inheritance; (3) living in a nursing home
within 5 years; and (4) living an additional 10 to 15
years. The first two variables serve as proxy measures
for the individual’s desire to protect assets for heirs
(see Note 11). The information from the latter two
variables is used to identify those individuals who expect to enter a nursing home in 5 years, and those
who expect to live more than a decade from the interview. Finally, a dummy variable is set equal to one
for individuals who expect more than a 50% probability of entering a nursing home in 5 years and more
than a 50% probability of living an additional 10 to
15 years. As the average nursing home stay is 29
months (Gabrel & Jones, 2000), this variable may
capture expectations of returning home after a nursing home stay and also reflect an individual’s motivation to protect assets for his or her own future use.
In the first column, the relationships between
long-term care insurance and all four expectation
variables are examined. The only significant relationship is found with nursing home expectations. Those
who have higher expectations of a nursing home stay
are more likely to have long-term care insurance.
This should be interpreted with some caution, as having insurance may increase the individual’s expectations about staying in a nursing home. In a model including only the financial transfer variables, neither
expectations of providing financial help nor expectations of providing an inheritance has a significant relationship with long-term care insurance. Finally, in

The general positive effect of assets reported in Tables 2 and 3 may represent the role of asset protection as a motive for insurance. Or, the relationship
may be observed because individuals with more
wealth have stronger preferences for insurance. One
way to distinguish between these two explanations is
to examine the difference in the effect of nonhousing
assets compared to housing assets. Results reported
in Table 2 show that “protected assets,” that is, assets
in the form of housing equity that are protected from
the Medicaid spend-down process, do not have a significant effect on long-term care insurance. Because
assets unprotected from the Medicaid spend-down
process appear to matter in the long-term care insurance decision and protected assets do not, these results are consistent with evidence of asset protection.
That is, asset protection cannot be ruled out based on
these tests, although asset protection may not be the
only explanation consistent with these findings. Nonhousing assets differ from housing assets in terms of
determining Medicaid eligibility, and they also differ
in terms of liquidity. Thus, these results do not offer
exclusive support for the relevance of asset protection.
Another test of asset protection is whether asset effects are significantly different for those with heirs,
such as children or spouses, compared to individuals
without children or spouses. To test this, two series of
interaction terms were added to the model specification shown in Table 2, column 3. The first set of three
interaction terms is calculated by multiplying each of
the asset dummy variables by a dummy variable
equal to one if the respondent has any children; the
second set is calculated by multiplying the asset
dummies by a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is married. In separate models not reported
here, the null hypotheses that either set of interaction
terms was jointly equal zero cannot be rejected.
These results do not suggest any difference in the ef-

Table 4. The Relationship Between Expectations and Long-Term Care Insurance
Variable Name
Financial help

Explanatory Variables

Inheritance

Expected probability of providing financial
help to family members in next 10 years
Expected probability of leaving an inheritance

Nursing home

Expected probability of entering a nursing home within 5 years

Living 10 years

Expected probability of living an additional 10–15 years

High nursing
home expectations
High expectations of
living 10 years
Return

Expects at least a 50% probability of entering a nursing home

Model 1

Model 2

0.00002
(0.37)
0.00003
(0.62)
0.0003**
(4.43)
–0.00001
(0.20)

0.00003
(0.66)
0.00002
(0.54)

Expects at least a 50% probability of living an additional 10–15 years
High Nursing Home Expectations ⫻
High Expectations of Living 10 years

Sample size

5,273

6,170

Model 3

0.012*
(2.13)
–0.004
(1.28)
0.010
(1.25)
5,622

Notes: All models include the following explanatory variables: income, income squared, age, age squared, housing equity, housing
equity squared, education, female, married, number of children, non-White, poor health, and whether the respondent has difficulty with
any activity of daily living (ADL) or instrumental ADL, and dummies for residence in a metropolitan statistical area and by region.
*p ⬍ .05; **p ⬍ .01.
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the last column, where a variable is used to identify
those likely to have expectations of returning home
after a nursing home stay, there is no significant relationship between this expectation and owning longterm care insurance. This analysis does not support
either motivation for protecting assets, whether protection be for the benefit of heirs, or for the benefit of
an individual who expects to have a nursing home
stay in the next 5 years and live more than 10 years.

sets on insurance is no stronger when heirs are
present than not. Long-term care insurance is not associated with having expectations regarding leaving
inheritances and providing financial assistance to
family members.
Because the partnership programs alter the dynamic of asset effects by making it less costly to protect assets, these results cannot speak to the effects of
assets under the partnership programs. The McCall
and associates’ study (1998) is noteworthy in that it is
the first study to examine long-term care insurance
purchase under the partnership regime; future research on the potential effectiveness of the partnerships program should incorporate a similar sample
but with improved asset data. In addition, it will be
essential in future research to address the question of
how Medicaid costs are affected by the partnerships.

Discussion
The results of this study differ substantially from previous research that has examined the relationship between assets and long-term care insurance ownership.
Previous research has either specified a linear relationship between insurance and assets, or used categorical
dummies to produce mixed results regarding the direction of the asset effect. One study (McCall et al., 1998)
suggests that the probability of having insurance increases with wealth, another (Kumar et al., 1995) suggests that it decreases with wealth. In this article, several model specifications, including the use of a spline
function in assets, suggest that the effect of assets is to
increase the probability of owning long-term care insurance at all levels, but that the effect dampens as assets increase. A difference in the role of assets for those
with low wealth compared to those with high values
of wealth was consistently shown in several models.
Those with the highest levels of wealth are least influenced by assets in the decision to purchase long-term
care insurance.
In addition, the estimated effect of assets that are
unprotected from the Medicaid spend-down process
(financial assets such as checking, savings, IRA accounts, and certificates of deposit) contrasts with the
effect of “protected” assets measured as the value of
housing equity. While unprotected assets have a sizable effect on long-term care insurance ownership,
protected assets have no significant effect. This pattern is consistent with the motive of asset protection.
However, there is little evidence to support the view
that long-term care insurance is a form of asset protection for heirs. In contrast, the only significant relationship between long-term care insurance and expectations existed among those who had high
expectations of a nursing home stay. One explanation that is consistent with these results is that individuals protect assets in order to pay for additional
expenses while they are in a nursing home.
These results speak directly to two concerns regarding the public–private partnership program for
long-term care. First, it appears that those most influenced by assets in the purchase of long-term care insurance are those with lower levels of assets, and not
the very wealthy. This suggests that the concern by
some that the partnerships program creates liberalized Medicaid eligibility to protect the assets of the
wealthy is not warranted. Those most influenced to
protect assets are those with low or middle levels of
assets. Second, because assets matter, one cannot
rule out asset protection as a motive for purchasing
long-term care insurance; however, the effect of asVol. 40, No. 5, 2000

References
Cohen, M.A., Kumar, N., McGuire, T., & Wallack, S. S. (1992). Financing
long-term care: A practical mix of public and private. Journal of Health
Politics, Policy and Law, 17, 403–438.
Gabrel, C., & Jones, A. (2000). The national nursing home survey: 1997 summary. National Center for Health Statistics. Vital and Health Statistics, 13
(147).
Greene, W. H. (1993). Econometric analysis (2nd ed.). New York: MacMillan.
Health Care Financing Administration. (2000). National health expenditures,
by source of funds and type of expenditures. Baltimore Office of the
Actuary, National Health Statistics Group.
HIAA (Health Insurance Association of America). (1992). Who buys long-term
care insurance? Washington, DC: Health Insurance Association of
America.
Kumar, N., Cohen, M. A., Bishop, C. E., Wallack, S. S. (1995). Understanding the factors behind the decision to purchase varying coverage
amounts of long-term care insurance. Health Services Research, 29,
653–678.
McCall, N., Mangle, S., Bauer, E., & Knickman, J. (1998). Factors important
in the purchase of partnership long-term care insurance. Health Services Research, 33, 187–203.
Mellor, J. M. (2000). Long-term care and nursing home coverage: Are adult
children substitutes for insurance? Unpublished manuscript. Williamsburg, VA: The College of William and Mary.
Myers, G. C. (Ed.). (1997). Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest
Old (AHEAD): Initial results from the longitudinal study. The Journals
of Gerontology, 52B (Special Issue).
Sloan, F. A., & Norton, E. C. (1997). Adverse selection, bequests, crowding
out, and private demand for insurance: Evidence from the long-term
care insurance market. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 15, 201–219.
Wiener, J. M., & Hanley, R. J. (1992). The Connecticut model for financing
long-term care: A limited partnership? Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 40, 1069–1072.
Wiener, J. M., Illston, L. H., & Hanley, R. J. (1994). Sharing the burden:
Strategies for public and private long-term care insurance. Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution.

Received June 2, 1999
Accepted June 7, 2000
Decision Editor: Vernon L. Greene, PhD

Appendix
Notes
1. Because such a small percentage of the population purchases private insurance, the focus of
many research studies has been why individuals
do not purchase insurance. Leading explanations include the high cost of premiums due to
adverse selection and moral hazard. Reasons for
purchasing insurance, reported in surveys of pur603
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not including the primary home, and the value
of vehicles.

chasers, include increasing choice of nursing
home care, maintaining independence, and
avoiding welfare (HIAA, 1992).

7. Marginal effects are calculated as  (x␤) ␤,
where  is the standard normal density, x is a
vector of mean values for all explanatory variables, and ␤ is the probit coefficient. Marginal
effects for binary variables are calculated as the
discrete change as the dummy goes from 0 to 1.
The reported t statistics are for the hypothesis test
of the underlying coefficient being equal to zero.

2. “Back-end” coverage describes plans in which
private insurance or out-of-pocket payments
cover some initial period of care, and public insurance covers the costs for the remainder of the
care period. The partnership programs are an example of back-end coverage.
3. These observations are not eliminated from the
sample; instead, results are based on a model
where a dummy variable for “missing assets” is
included as an explanatory variable.

8. Of the additional covariates included in the
model reported in Table 2, education has a positive and significant effect on ownership of longterm care insurance. Ownership of long-term care
insurance increases with both age and household
income. Of the three measures of health status,
only the dummy variable for poor health status is
statistically significant. Those in poor health are
less likely to have long-term care insurance. Relative to respondents living in the eastern United
States, respondents in other regions of the country
are more likely to own long-term care insurance.

4. For more on the use of spline regression, or linear piecewise regression, see Green (1993).
5. This number is lower than the estimated 4% and
5% reported in the studies cited in the introduction. However, the age of the AHEAD sample (at
an average of 76.5 years) is consistent with a
smaller percentage of individuals having longterm care policies, because (a) few insurance
companies sold these policies until the mid1980s, and (b) premiums increase with age. In
addition, the estimate of 4–5% is produced by
the Health Insurance Association of America,
which derives this estimate from the number of
policies sold relative to the population, not accounting for lapses in coverage or deaths.

9. The 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the asset
distribution are $3,000, $25,000, and $105,000,
respectively.
10. The 50th percentile in assets is $25,000, the
90th is $302,000. Also used as knots are the
33rd percentile ($7,000) and the 66th percentile
($65,300).

6. The financial assets included in this measure
are: checking, savings, money market accounts,
CDs, government savings bonds, T-bills, IRAs,
KEOGHs, stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts,
business equity, bonds, bond funds, real estate

11. However, some respondents who expect to
leave assets for a spouse may not perceive that
as either an inheritance or a financial transfer.
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